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NOTE

Preventing the Theft and Illegal Export
of Art in a Europe Without Borders
ABSTRACT

The opening of internal borders within the European Community
presents tremendous opportunityfor European economic growth. Yet with
all the potential benefits come many problems. Increased illegal art trafficking is one of these problems. This Note examines European treaties,
laws of the individual EC Member States, and Community-wide treaties
and regulations designed to prevent the theft and illegal export of art.
The Note discusses how the differing interests of the Member States have
prevented agreement on legislation to protect art and resulted in measures inadequate to protect Europe's vast art treasures. After analyzing
the latest EC regulatory attempt to protect art, the author concludes that
the current laws will not halt illegal art trade in the European Community and makes a proposalfor improving the present situation.
TABLE OF CONTENTS

I.
II.

INTRODUCTION ....................................
THE MAGNITUDE AND CAUSES OF ART THEFT .....

A.
B.
III.

Overview .................................
Opening EC Borders to the Theft and Illegal Export of Art ...............................

NON-EC

MEASURES

DESIGNED

TO

PREVENT

Early European Agreements .................
1.

646
646

Agreement on the Importation of Educa-

tional, Scientific, and Cultural Materials
(Florence Agreement) (1950) ............
2.

640

THE

THEFT AND ILLEGAL EXPORT OF ART ..............

A.

634
637
637

European Cultural Convention (Cultural

647

VANDERBILT JOURNAL OF TRANSNATIONAL LAW

B.

IV. EC

[Vol 26:633

Convention) (1954) ....................
3.
Hague Convention for the Protection of Cultural Property in the Event of Armed Conflict of 1954 (Hague Convention) ........
Laws of the EC Member States Designed to Protect Art from Theft and Illegal Export ........
1. The United Kingdom ..................
2.
France .............................
3.
Italy ................................
TREATIES,

REGULATIONS,

AND

B.
V.

EC Treaties ..............................
1. Article 36 of the EEC Treaty ...........
2.
The Treaty on European Union (Maastricht
T reaty) ..............................
EC Regulations and Directives ..............

VII.

650
651,
652
653

654

654
654
655
656

THE COMPETING BENEFITS AND DETRIMENTS OF AN

ACTIVE ART TRADE ................................
VI.

648

DIRECTIVES

DESIGNED TO PREVENT THE THEFT AND ILLEGAL
EXPORT OF ART ...............................

A.

648

EFFECTIVENESS OF PROPOSED SOLUTIONS ..........

CONCLUSION ......................................
I.

658
662
664

INTRODUCTION

The Roman Empire, revolutionary France, and Nazi Germany are
among the victors of military conquests who stole from the art collections
of other states to augment their own. These conquerors attempted to justify their actions by dressing them with ideological notions that superior
states should have superior art collections-essentially connoisseurship
by force. For example, the French plundered other states to amass their
vast art collections.' In the eighteenth century, a Hussar lieutenant rationalized the French practice of pillaging by telling the French Convention 2 that art works of other states had beeri "soiled too long by slavery"
and that they had liberated the art by bringing it to France, "the homeland of liberty and sacred equality." Napoleon, too, thought all great art

1. LEONARD D. DUBOFF, THE DESKBOOK OF ART LAW 132 (1977) [hereinafter
DUBOFF, DESKBOOK].
2. The Convention was the governing body of the French Republic from 1792 until
1795. OWEN CONNELLEY, FRENCH REVOLUTION/NAPOLEONIC ERA 5 (1979).

3. John Henry Merryman, The Protection of Artistic National Patrimony Against
Pillagingand Theft, in LAW AND THE VISUAL ARTS 156 (Leonard D. DuBoff & Mary
Ann Crawford DuBoff eds., 1974) [hereinafter Merryman, National Patrimony].
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belonged in France, as the true home of artistic genius.4 In fact, plundering Italy was Napoleon's explicit mission in 1796. Similarly, during the
Second World War, Nazi officers stole art from museums and private
collections throughout Central Europe' to create a cultural center for the
"superior" Aryan race.7
Modern "conquerors" need neither bloodshed nor ideology to pillage
Europe's art collections. Instead, the opening of internal borders between
European Community (EC) Member States, combined with the modern
practice of collecting illegally exported or stolen art, threatens to result in
a renewed plundering of Europe's vast art wealth. Under the EC open
border ideal, art may now be moved as easily as any other good." The

states of the European Economic Community signed the Single European Act9 in 1986 to advance realization of the fundamental principle of

French artists also believed France to be the proper home for great art. In October 1796,
many prominent French artists of the French Revolution era signed a petition to the
Directory, the governing body of France at the time, which stated: "The French Republic, by its strength and superiority of its enlightenment and its artists is the only country
in the world which can give a safe home to these masterpieces." Id.
4. DuBoFF, DESKBOOK, supra note 1, at 132. In 1796, Napoleon wrote from Milan:
"All men of genius, all those who have attained distinction in the republic of letters, are
French no matter in what country they may have been born." Merryman, National
Patrimony, supra note 3, at 156. Napoleon attempted to legalize his acquisitions by
including art concession clauses in treaties'with the Italians, including the Bologna Armistice Convention (1796) and the Treaty of Tolentino (1797). DuBoFF, DESKBOOK,
supra note 1, at 132. After the fall of Napoleon in 1815, many of the states tried to
recover their art works. Id. at 133. However, many works had been destroyed, defaced,
or poorly restored. Id.
5. FELIX MARKHAM, NAPOLEON 43 (1963). Napoleon recognized the importance of
protecting the art he took, requesting that experts be sent to select works suitable to send
to Paris and to arrange for safe transport. Id. Napoleon wrote to the Directory on May
9, 1796: "I repeat my request for a few reputable artists to take charge of the choice and
transport of the fine things we shall think fit to send to Paris." Id. The Italian Renaissance art that Napoleon took from Italy greatly influenced the neo-classical and romantic
schools in nineteenth-century French art. Paul M. Bator, An Essay on the International
Art Trade, 34 STAN. L. REV. 275, 308 (1982).
6. Stephan Kinzer, Weimar Journal; Amber-Tinted Rumors Whisper of Buried

Booty, N.Y. TIMES, May 27, 1992, at A4. A senior Nazi officer, Erich Koch, amassed
numerous valuable art works, possibly including the famed Amber Chamber. The Amber
Chamber was a room with walls of amber, filled with amber figurines, made as a gift to
the Russian royal family from King Frederick I of Prussia. Id.
7. DuBorF, DESKOOK, supra note 1, at 144. In addition to collecting art, Hitler
had "degenerate" Post-Impressionist works destroyed. Id.
8. Alan Riding, Europe, Unifying, Has Fearsfor Its Art, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 28,
1992, at C9,
9. Single European Act, 1987 O.J. (L 169) 1 [hereinafter SEA]. The SEA amended
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the European Community: the free movement of goods, persons, services,
and capital.10 The internal market officially came into being on January
1, 1993, despite the ongoing debate surrounding the issue of eliminating
customs and border checks. Thus, it will be more difficult to enforce the
export controls that most EC Member States place on art 1 and to detect
the movement of stolen art.
As early as 1989, EC Member States recognized that current provisions failed to protect their art treasures adequately and began working
to develop more effective measures.- 2 Despite early recognition of the

problem, the European Community has done little to remedy it. Like
many other issues facing the European Community, protecting art
treasures fuels regional tensions and raises the question systemic to European integration: how to prevent one problem, here, the theft and illegal export of art, without undermining the fundamental principle of free
movement of goods, persons, services, and capital within the European
Community.
Europe has much to lose if the European Community does not develop
proper measures to prevent art from being taken illegally from one EC
Member State to another or removed from the European Community
altogether. The European Community contains some of the world's
greatest art collections, housed in major museums such as the Louvre
(France), the Prado (Spain), the National Gallery of England, and the
Uffizi (Italy). Churches, private collections, and smaller galleries and'
museums that cannot afford adequate protection also hold many important works. 13

the Treaty Establishing the European Economic Community (EEC Treaty), and its articles were incorporated into the EEC Treaty. RALPH H. FOLSOM, EUROPEAN COMMUNITY LAW IN A NUTSHELL 23 (1992).
10. JOSEPHINE STEINER, TEXTBOOK OF EEC LAW 4 (3d ed., 1992). The twelve EC
Member States are Belgium, Denmark, Germany, Greece, Spain, France, Ireland, Italy,
Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Portugal, and the United Kingdom. Id. at 3-4. The European Community (EC) coordinates nineteen states whose economies have an output of
over 6.5 trillion dollars each year and encompasses a population of 375 million people.
Tom Redburn, The New Europe Looks More Like An Old Friend; 1993's 'Mythical

Significance' Holds Little Magic for the EC Single Market, IN'L HERALD TRm., Dec.
28, 1992.
11. These states include the United Kingdom, France, Spain, and Italy. See infra
part III.B.

12. Riding, supra note 8.
13. DuBOFF, DESKBOOK, supra note 1, at 70. Larger museums also suffer from
thefts. For example, in 1990, a Renoir portrait was stolen from the Louvre. Paige L.
Margules, International Art Theft and the Illegal Import and Export of Cultural
Property:A Study of Relevant Values, Legislation, and Solutions, 15 SUFFOLK TRANS-

ART THEFT
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This Note addresses the problem of illegal art trafficking in the European Community.1 ' First, Part II discusses the magnitude and causes of

illegal art trafficking in the context of the EC objective of eliminating
internal frontiers, the realization of which will facilitate illegal movement of art from and within the European Community. Next, Part III
surveys and analyzes non-EC agreements in effect among European
states and the laws enacted by individual Member States to protect and
regulate the movement of cultural property.1 5 Part IV sets out EC treaties and legislation that are designed to prevent the theft and illegal export of art. Part V then discusses the detriments and benefits of an active
art trade. Part VI assesses the effectiveness of the recently passed EC
legislation on the export of cultural property. Finally, the Note concludes that the European Community must recognize the true goal of
export controls as the protection and preservation of Europe's common
cultural heritage, which will best be protected through an active, regulated art trade.
II.

THE MAGNITUDE AND CAUSES OF ART THEFT

A.

Overview

Art theft posed a severe threat to the art treasures of the Member
States of the European Community even before the elimination of border
controls in 1993. In 1986, the illegal art trade ranked second in value
only to drug trafficking on the international black market.16 Moreover,
statistics indicate that the rate of art theft increases with each passing

NAT'L

L.J. 609, 609 n.2 (1992).

14. This Note does not address the many contract, title, and ownership issues which
arise from both legal and illegal art transactions. See generally INTERNATIONAL SALES
OF WORKS OF ART (Pierre Lalive ed., 1988) (providing a summary of many European
states' laws on these issues, including those of Greece, Italy, and France). Also, the controversy about the repatriation of art works, such as the controversy surrounding the
Elgin Marbles, is outside the scope of this Note. See infra note 172 and accompanying
text.
15. For the purposes of this Note, no distinction has been drawn between "art," such
as paintings and sculpture, and archeological "artifacts," although the Note focuses primarily on art. Some scholars distinguish the two categories on the basis of whether the
object was intended to be useful and has "scientific" value (artifact) or has primarily
aesthetic value (art). See Bator, supra note 5, at 285.
16. Leah E. Eisen, The Missing Piece: A Discussion of Theft, Statutes of Limitations, and Title Disputes in the Art World, 81 J. CRiM. L. 1067, 1068 (1991). Art
traded on the black market each year has been estimated to be worth over one billion
dollars. Id.
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year.1" In 1991, one scholar estimated that illegal trade in art for that
one year doubled the 1986 figure.18
Theft is widespread throughout the European Community. For example, thieves robbed three French museums on the same day in 1990,19
and thefts for that year totalled more than 60,000 art works in the Euro-

pean Community alone. 20 England is robbed of 5,000 paintings per
year, 21 and between 1970 and 1989, 244,403 paintings, statues, frescoes,
coins, and other items were stolen from Italy.2 2
The profitability of the art market fuels art theft. Internationally, the
trade in art has been placed as high as fifty billion dollars per year.23
Single paintings sell for tens of millions of dollars, such as Vincent Van
Gogh's Portraitdu Docteur Gachet, which commanded seventy-five million dollars, before calculating the auctioneer's commission."' Not only
are the prices paid high, but so are the profits. For example, in 1987,
Van Gogh's Irises sold for 53.9 million dollars; the seller had paid only
eighty-seven thousand dollars for the painting in 1947.25
Also, the value of art works has risen at a rate faster than that of
inflation, making art a good investment.2 6 The art market tends to rise

17. Margules, supra note 13, at 609 n.1. Between 1980 and 1985, painting thefts
per year almost doubled. Id.

18. Joseph F. Edwards, Major Global Treaties For the Protection And Enjoyment
of Art and Cultural Objects, 22 U. TOL. L. REv. 919, 921 (1991). The author attributes the drastic increase to the higher prices that buyers are willing to pay for art works.

Id.
19. Margules, supra note 13, at 609 n.2. Within an hour, two Parisian museums
were robbed: a Renoir was stolen from the Louvre Museum and a painting by Ernest
Hebert was stolen from the Hebert Museum. Id. Also, the Musee Carnavalet was
robbed of a Paul Huet landscape on the same day. Id.

20.

Kate Dourian, Traffic In Stolen Artwork Faces Attack, Insurance: Police in

Europe Fear That Theft Will Increase When Border Controls Are DroppedNext Year,
L.A. TIMEs, Nov. 24, 1991, at A30.
21. Id.

22. Clyde Haberman, Italy Fears That Its Art Treasures Will Scatter in a Unifled
Europe, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 5, 1990, at Al. Italy possesses over sixty percent of the
world's cultural property, and much of it is in unguarded churches and inadequately
secured museums and galleries. Id.; DuBoFF, DSKBOOK, supra note 1, at 70. Not surprisingly, Italy's problem with art theft is especially acute. According to the Italian government, fifty million dollars worth of art is stolen each year. LEONARD D. DuBOFF,
ART LAW IN A NUTSHELL 11 (2nd ed., 1993) [hereinafter DuBOFF, NUTSHELL].
23. Eisen, supra note 16, at 1067.
24. Edwards, supra note 18, at 920.
25. Eisen, supra note 16, at 1067. Another seller made a 42.02 million dollar profit
on the sale of Pablo Picasso's Yo Picasso in 1989. Id.
26. Dourian, supra note 20. Paintings, silver, and antiques have all appreciated at a

19931

ART THEFT

when the stock market declines, reflecting a belief that art is more valuable than money or stocks.17 For example, in 1975, the value of French
Impressionist works rose 230 percent, while stocks on the Dow Jones
rose only 38 percent.28
Several other factors contribute to the extent of the traffic in stolen art.
Stolen art is often used in other illegal activities, such as money laundering schemes 29 and arms and drug deals.30 Art also serves as collateral for
loans.3" Additionally, insurers willingly pay ransom money for stolen art
works because the thief usually demands an amount lower than the
amount due to the owner under the policy.32
Finally, the low recovery rate for stolen art-ten percent worldwide"3 -does not deter thefts.3 4 The French recovery rate is less than
thirty percent.3 5 In Italy, as art thefts have increased, the recovery rate
has decreased from thirty percent to ten percent. 6 Catching art thieves is
difficult because they do not fit a typical profile 7 and because they usu-

rate faster than inflation. Id.
27. DuBoFF, NUTSHELL, supra note 22, at 42-43.
28. Id. at 43.
29. Dourian, supra note 20. Detective Richard Ellis of Scotland Yard's Art and Antiques Squad explains how drug dealers use art purchases to launder money: "If you
have a bundle of money which has been acquired through a drug sale, you can go to an
auction, buy in cash and then use it as collateral. You can recoup the money later on
with a receipt. Then you have clean money." Id.
30. Alexander Stille, Art Thieves Bleed Italy's Heritage, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 2, 1992,
at 2:27. For example, in 1991, Italian police found in Jamaica twenty-seven paintings
stolen from an Italian museum that apparently had been used to finance a drug deal. See
also, Margules, supra note 13, at 612 n.15.
31. Margules, supra note 13, at 612 n.15. Often the art is deposited in a bank, in
states such as Switzerland, the Cayman Islands, and Liechtenstein. Id. In Switzerland,
for example, a stolen or illegally exported art work belongs to its depositor after five
years, as long as the depositor is not the thief. Dourian, supra note 20. Throughout the
five-year period, the work can serve as collateral for loans. Id.
32. Margules, supra note 13, at 612 n.15.
33. Id. at 610 n.4. Small antiques or movable items of silver are almost never recovered. Dourian, supra note 20. The recovery rate is higher for major art works than for
less-renowned works. Constance Lowenthal, Debunking Dr. No, WALL ST. J., Mar. 31,
1993, at A12. Major art works are less likely to be sold on legitimate markets, however.

Id.
34. Margules, supra note 13, at 612 n.15 and accompanying text. Art works may be
recovered with time. For example, the French police recovered Monet's Impression: Sunrise and other Impressionist works stolen in 1985 at gunpoint from Paris' Musee
Marmottan five years later in Corsica. Lowenthal, supra note 33.

35. Margules, supra note 13, at 610 n.4.
36.

Stille, supra note 30, at 2:27.

37. Carol L. Morris, Note, In Search of a Stolen Masterpiece: The Causes and

640
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ally take the stolen art across national borders. 8
Politicians and law enforcement officials agree that art thefts will increase with the opening of the borders between the EC Member States."
The sixteenfold increase in art theft in Czechoslovakia since it opened its
borders serves as an all-too-real example for cultural officials.4 Although border controls between EC Member States only gradually loosened prior to 1993, art thefts greatly increased., 1 In 1990, the chief of
the Italian art-theft police squad already had noticed an increase in the
involvement of organized crime in art thefts and remarked that "1992
will certainly make our job more difficult."4 2
B.

Opening EC Borders to the Theft and Illegal Export of Art

The goal of establishing a Europe without restrictions on the movement of goods, persons, services, and capital has existed since the signing

of the Treaty Establishing the European Economic Community (EEC
Treaty) in 1957. In 1987, the Single European Act (SEA) added sections

SYRACUSE J. INT'L L. & COM. 57, 71 (1988).
Art thieves range from the individual stealing to support a drug habit to the seasoned
veterans who rob churches and museums at gunpoint. Stille, supra note 30, at 2:27.
Thieves also come in more benign guises. For example, the U.S. Customs Service allowed a couple to enter the United States with twenty-two suitcases full of Egyptian
artifacts because they had eleven children, many of whom were crying. Morris, supra, at
71 n.81. The couple attributed the number of suitcases to the size of their family. Id.
38. Bator, supra note 5, at 293-94. The ease of transporting art makes its theft
alluring. John B. McPhee, Jr. et al., The National Stolen Art File, THE EXPERT AND
THE LAW, Jan.-Feb. 1984, at 8. An oil painting on canvas can be taken from its frame,
rolled up, and carried easily. Id. Such removal, of course, seriously damages the art
work. Id.
39. For example, Italian art historian and senator Giulio Carlo Argan stated: "I
consider the opening of the frontiers an extreme menace to the cultural heritage of Italy.
The law of the European Community shouldn't treat our works of art in the same manner as it treats common merchandise." Pascal Privat, Arrivederci, Canova, NEWSWEEK,
May 14, 1990, at 72D.
40. DuBOFF, NUTSHELL, supra note 22, at 12. Poland also experienced a great increase in art theft when it relaxed its travel restrictions in the 1970s. Mary Battiata, E.

Remedies of InternationalArt Theft, 15

Europe's Art Heritage Being Ravaged By Thieves; Western Collectors Said To Buy,
WASH. PosT, Feb. 27, 1992, at Al. Nova Europa, a Polish daily newspaper, reported in
1992 that "[m]ost everything of value has already left the country." Id.
41. Privat, supra note 39, at 72D.
42. Haberman, supra note 22. The superintendent of Fine Arts of the Province of
Florence said that if crime syndicates become more organized art thieves, then "[i]t
would
mean locking most of the nation's art in bank vaults. In short, the end of culture as we
know it." Privat, supra note 39, at 72D.
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to the EEC Treaty to speed the removal of internal frontiers.43 For example, Article 8A called for the enactment of measures that would ensure the establishment of the internal market by January 1, 1993.44
The EC Commission4 5 created the internal market to improve the economic health of the Member States.4 Estimates predict that unification
will result in a gross domestic product increase of 4.5 to 7 percent, a
price decrease of 4.5 to 6 percent, and an additional 1.75 to 5 million
jobs.4 The EC also will save approximately 100 billion ECUs (European Currency Units) per year as a result of the elimination of internal
barriers.4 8 Europe's economy has indeed shown improvement since the
passage of the SEA in 1986: investment in Europe has increased, millions of jobs have been created, new products have become available, and
states such as Spain, Portugal, and Ireland have updated their

economies.49
To create the free market, the European Community abolished customs, baggage, and passport checks. Goods moving within the European
Community therefore no longer require customs documentation. 50 The
EEC Treaty itself does not define the terms "goods" and "services." The
European Court of Justice (ECJ),5" however, has held that the terms

43. STEINER, supra note 10, at 4. The SEA also extended EC powers and changed
EC decision-making procedures. Id.
44. Article 8A (SEA) of the EEC Treaty provides:
The Community shall adopt measures with the aim of progressively establishing
the internal market over a period expiring on 31 December 1992.... The internal
market shall comprise an area without internal frontiers in which the free movement of goods, persons, services and capital is ensured in accordance with the provisions of this Treaty.
TREATY ESTABLISHING THE EUROPEAN ECONOMIC COMMUNITY art. 8A [hereinafter
EEC TREATY].
45. The Commission, originally established by the Treaty of Paris as one of the
governing bodies of the European Coal and Steel Community, became a governing body
of the EEC under the EEC Treaty. STEINER, supra note 10, at 4.
46. Article 2 of the EEC Treaty states that the purpose of unification is to promote
"harmonious development of economic activities, a continuous and balanced expansion,
an increase in stability, an accelerated raising of the standard of living and closer relations" between EC Member States. EEC TREATY, supra note 44, art. 2.
47. FoLsoM, supra note 9, at 23. These figures were part of the Cecchini Report
sponsored by the EC Commission. Id. at 22.
48. Id. Customs posts alone cost an estimated eleven billion dollars per year. Id. at
125.
49. See Redburn, supra note 10.
50. EC: Europe Documents; No 1796-State of Completion of the Single Market (2
of 3), AGENCE EUROPE, Sept. 11, 1992. [hereinafter Europe Documents].
51. The European Court of Justice is the European Community's authoritative judi-
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encompass anything that can have a monetary value placed on it and
therefore can be the subject of a commercial transaction.5 2 Any border
controls retained by an EC Member State may not discriminate against
53
the goods' national origin or the means by which they are transported.
A Member State may still control the movement of goods throughout its
entire territory, including its borders, but may not use this authority to
maintain border checks.5 4
The European Community has taken two major steps to enable the
free movement of goods: the establishment of a customs union and the
elimination of quantitative restrictions on imports and exports. The customs union abolished duties, tariffs, and "measures having the equivalent
effect" on goods traded among the Member States.5 5 The ECJ has
deemed any fee paid because goods were imported into another Member
State, whether paid at the time of the border crossing or not, to be a
"measure having the equivalent effect" of a duty and, therefore, in violation of the elimination of customs duties.5
Additionally, the EEC Treaty abolished quantitative restrictions on
the movement of goods, including quotas and bans on export or import.5
The ECJ has broadly defined measures having the same effect as quantitative restrictions as any trading rules "capable of hindering, directly or
indirectly, actually or potentially, intra-Community trade."'5' To violate
the prohibition against quantitative restrictions on exports, a measure
must expressly control exports and create an advantage for domestic
59
products or trade.
The elimination of customs checks included ending baggage searches
as of January 1, 1993.60 EC nationals moving by road, rail, air, or sea

cial body. Article 164 of the EEC Treaty states: "The Court of Justice shall ensure that
in the interpretation and application of this Treaty the law is observed." EEC TREATY,
supra note 44, art. 164.
52. Re: Export Tax on Art Treasures: E.C. Commission v. Italy, case 7168, 35
C.M.L.R. 1, 5 (1969). The ECJ held that art satisfied this definition of "goods." Id. at

8.
53.

Europe Documents, supra note 50.

54. Id.
55. See EEC TREATY, supra note 44, arts. 9, 12, 13, and 16.
56. STEINER, supra note 10, at 73. Also, the ECJ has ruled that making import
duties minimal does not make them acceptable. Id.
57. EEC TREATY, supra note 44, arts. 30 and 34.
58. STEINER, supra note 10, at 82. The ECJ has applied this definition since its
pronouncement in 1974 in Procureurdu Roi v. Dassonville, case 8/74. Id. at 83-84.

59. Id. at 91.

60. Council Regulation, concerning the elimination of controls and formalities applicable to cabin and hold baggage of persons taking an intra-community flight and the
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from one EC Member State to another no longer have their baggage
checked at internal borders.6" Individuals entering a Member State from
outside the European Community must clear their luggage through customs at their point of entry only. 2 In its preamble, the Regulation eliminating baggage searches did allow for measures that would prevent illegal art export without contravening Community law.' The Regulation,
however, did not give examples of acceptable controls.
To enable the free movement of persons throughout the EC, passport
checks on individuals moving between EC Member States also officially
ended on January 1, 1993.64 Passengers entering from outside the Euro-

pean Community still must clear immigration and customs, however.6 5
Ultimately, movement among EC Member States should be as easy as
movement among states in the United States. 6 Customs officials may
continue to stop persons believed to be involved in criminal activities,
such as drug smuggling and terrorism, but they will have to identify
67
these persons without the aid of identity checks.
The EC has more successfully removed barriers to the movement of
goods than to the movement of persons.6 ' Both political and mechanical
concerns have contributed to the delay in fully implementing a borderfree Europe. The United Kingdom, Ireland, Denmark, and Greece con-

baggage of people making an intra-community sea crossing, 3925/91, art. 9, 1991 O.J.
(L 374) 6 [hereinafter Council Regulation 3925/91].
61. See James T. Yenckel, Bending European Borders, WASH. PosT, Jan. 24,
1993, at El. In the case of travel by air or sea, the elimination of baggage searches
applies both to hand and checked luggage. Council Regulation 3925/91, supra note 60,
art. 1.
62. Yenckel, supra note 61. However, luggage belonging to a traveler coming first
from a non-EC airport and stopping in an EC airport before continuing to another EC
airport will not be checked until the final stop. Council Regulation 3925/91, supra note
60, art. 3.
63. Council Regulation 3925/91, supra note 60, pmbl. The preamble to Council
Regulation 3925/91 provides: "Whereas Member States must, however, be free to take
specific measures compatible with Community law for the purpose of carrying out special controls, inter alia, in order to prevent criminal activities linked in particular to ...
" Id.
the traffic in works of art ....
64. EEC TREATY, supra note 44, art. 8A.
65. Yenckel, supra note 61.
66. Joel Havemann, Solving the Euro Puzzle-From Auctions To Athletes, EC
Stumbles Over Obstacles; Longstanding Rivalries, Suspicions And Jealousies Undermine Efforts to Achieve Unity, L.A. TImm, Dec. 8, 1992, at 4.
67. EC: Please Have Your Passports Ready-'Schengenland'-TheNew EC Zone
With No Internal Borders, GUARDIAN, July 22, 1992. [hereinafter Schengenland].
68. See Free Movement of Goods, 1992 CooPERs & LYBRAND EUR. 1 (1993).
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tinue to check passports at their frontiers, 9 and Spain continues to check
70
persons crossing from the British colony of Gibraltar.
The attitude of the United Kingdom has been a major obstacle to the
elimination of border controls. As an island state, the United Kingdom
believes that it can more effectively guard its borders against illegal immigrants and criminals than EC Member States on the continent and
that it should therefore continue to take precautions. 71 The United Kingdom's opposition to the elimination of passport checks also implicates
Ireland because the two states have a free movement agreement.7 2 A
compromise known as the "Bangemann wave," named for the former
EC commissioner in charge of the program to abolish internal frontiers,
has been reached with the United Kingdom.73 The "Bangemann wave"
simply requires that EC citizens present, or wave, their unopened pass74
ports as they pass through immigration.
Other delays stem from the need to redesign facilities to enable travelers to move freely. For example, some airports must be modified to
75
accommodate new EC policies and will not be ready until late 1993.
Also, some customs posts still need to be redesigned to allow traffic to
76
flow freely across internal borders.
Additionally, many of the EC's programs to prevent crime have not
been fully implemented. The European Information System (EIS),

69.
70.

Redburn, supra note 10, at 5.
E.G. Executive Steps Up Campaign to End Border Controls, AGENCE FRANCE
PRESSE, May 8, 1992.
71. Schengenland, supra note 67. In 1991, 46 million people entered the United
Kingdom, not including those entering from Ireland who do not have to have their passports checked. Id. Of these, British citizens returning counted for more than 29 million,
EC nationals for 8 million, and non-EC nationals for 9 million. Id. Over 18,000 were
not allowed entry, usually because immigration believed that the individuals were coming
for work rather than a short stay. Id. Other reasons for exclusion included forged travel
documents, no entry visa, no work permits, and failure to qualify for settlement. Id.
Forty to fifty percent of the persons refused entry were EC nationals, according to immigration service estimates. Id.
72. EC: Delay in Abolition of Controls on Persons at Intracommunity Frontiers,
AGENCE EUROPE, Jan. 7, 1993.
73. Id.
74. EC: The Single Market-Little Progresson Freedom of Movement, GUARDIAN,
Dec. 31, 1992 [hereinafter Single Market].

75. Id. The elimination of passport checks requires that airports be rebuilt so that
passengers moving from one EC Member State to another are not required to pass
through immigration. Schengenland, supra note 67. Airports in the European Community are expected to be ready in December 1993 at the earliest. Redburn, supra note 10.
76. EC: First Assessment of Single Market is Positive, AGENCE EUROPE, Jan. 30,
1993.
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which will allow authorities to share information about criminals and
crime,7 has not been created yet. 7 Also, the EC cooperative police organization, Europol, has not been fully organized to meet the needs of
the EC.79 Currently, Europol's role is limited to trying to prevent drug

smuggling."s
Originally, the EC Commission planned to take action against Member States that did not comply with the January 1, 1993 deadline. Former EC Commissioner Martin Bangemann said that he would institute
legal action against EC Member States refusing to stop customs checks

and that he would encourage Community citizens to sue for damages

from Member States continuing this practice.8" The EC Commission believed that the continuing presence of border controls would be deemed a
failure of the unification process inside and outside the European Com-

munity.82 The new commissioner charged with the elimination of border
checks, however, wants to avoid conflict among Member States and will
not prosecute provided that the states continue taking steps toward the

elimination of the border controls.83
Frustrated by the lack of progress toward eliminating internal barriers, several EC Member States independently signed the Schengen
Agreement in 1985 to abolish internal frontiers more quickly. 4 A second
agreement reached in 1990, the "Schengen Convention,"8s addressed the
actual means for achieving the abolition of border checks.8 8 The Conven-

77. Id.
78.

Europe Documents, supra note 50.

79. EC: Delay in Abolition of Controls on Persons at Intracommunity Frontiers,
supra note 72.
80. Id.
81. Schengenland, supra note 67. This threat was weakened by the fact that the
European Court of Justice suffers from a huge backlog of cases. Id. Any citizen's case
could take as long as two years to come before the court. Id. The court could accelerate
one of the cases, but probably would decide not to do so. Single Market, supra note 74.

82. E.C. Executive Steps Up Campaign To End Border Controls, supra note 70.
83. EC: MEPs Say Commission Should Be Stricter with Countries Which Have Not
Abolished Border Controls, AGENCE EUROPE, Jan. 29, 1993.
84. Introduction to Belgium-France-Federal Republic of Germany-LuxembourgNetherlands: Schengen Agreement on the Gradual Abolition of Checks at Their Common Borders and the Convention Applying the Agreement, 30 I.L.M. 68 (1991) [hereinafter Introduction]. Italy joined the Convention in 1990, and Spain and Portugal have
been admitted as observers to the Convention. Id.
85. The convention's full name is the "Agreement between the Governments of the
States of the Benelux Economic Union, the Federal Republic of Germany and the
French Republic on the gradual abolition of controls at common frontiers." Id. at 73.
86. Id. The Schengen Convention covers matters such as the treatment of immi-

grants, police force cooperation, drug trafficking, arms, and explosives. Id.
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tion only requires that the parties develop plans to eliminate checks, and
it imposes few specific duties on the parties.8 7 The Schengen states did
not meet their goal of eliminating border controls by January 1, 1990.88
Generally, now, however, border checks between the states have been
abolished."9
III.

NON-EC MEASURES DESIGNED TO PREVENT THE THEFT AND
ILLEGAL EXPORT OF ART

A. Early European Agreements
Throughout the twentieth century, European states have taken collective action to protect their artistic heritages and to regulate the flow of
art works across their borders. In the decade after World War II, many
European states entered into agreements for this purpose, such as the
Agreement on the Importation of Educational, Scientific, and Cultural
Materials (Florence Agreement) (1950),9" the European Cultural Convention (Cultural Convention) (1954),"1 and the Hague Convention for
the Protection of Cultural Property in the Event of Armed Conflict of
1954 (Hague Convention). 2 These agreements imposed vague restrictions on the treatment of art. They made a start, however, toward resolving the ongoing conflict among EC Member States about the import and
export of art by recognizing that Europe's cultural heritage is a shared
one.

87. Id.
88. EC: FirstAssessment of Single Market is Positive, supra note 76. Part of the
Schengen states' delay was attributed to the fact that the Schengen Information System
(SIS) was not ready. Id. The SIS will contain the names of individuals that any of the
states want to keep out and will be used to prevent those persons from entering through
another Schengen state. Alan Riding, It's 1993 and Europe Still Has Borders, N.Y.
TIMES, Jan. 31, 1993, at 5:6. Also, it will contain a list of states whose citizens must
have a visa to enter. Id. The United States is not on the list. Id.
89. Havemann, supra note 66. As of December 1992, one writer reported that border checks "have already all but disappeared" between the original five Schengen states.
Id.
90. Agreement on the Importation of Educational, Scientific and Cultural Materials,
Nov. 22, 1950, 131 U.N.T.S. 26. [hereinafter Florence Agreement].
91. European Cultural Convention, Dec. 19, 1954, 218 U.N.T.S. 139.
92. Hague Convention for the Protection of Cultural Property in the Event of
Armed Conflict (1954), reprinted in 1 UNITED NATIONS EDUCATIONAL, SCIENTIFIC
AND CULTURAL ORGANIZATION (UNESCO), THE PROTECTION OF MOVABLE CULTURAL PROPERTY: COMPENDIUM OF LEGISLATIVE TEXTS (1984) [hereinafter Hague
Convention].
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1. Agreement on the Importation of Educational, Scientific, and Cultural Materials (Florence Agreement)(1950)
The Agreement on the Importation of Educational, Scientific, and
Cultural Materials was one of the first major agreements after the Second World War regarding restrictions on the import and export of art.9 3
This agreement, commonly referred to as the Florence Agreement, represented an effort by the leaders of European states94 to prevent future
armed conflicts through the free exchange of ideas. The signatory states
declared in the Agreement's preamble that increased international understanding through the exchange of cultural materials would help maintain
world peace. 5
The Florence Agreement's impact was more symbolic than real because it imposed only vague regulations and responsibilities on its signatories. For example, contracting states had to aid in importing and subsequently re-exporting cultural materials used in public exhibitions."
Also, the parties retained the right to prevent the importation and circulation of works for national security or public morality reasons.9 7 This
ability to derogate from the agreement's obligations robbed the treaty of
much of its force. The Florence Agreement mandated "expeditious and
safe" customs checks9" and prohibited the imposition of customs duties
on the import of cultural materials.9 9 Finally, the agreement created a
forum for handling disputes concerning whether materials merited "cultural" status and therefore qualified for the agreement's protections.'"
The treaty provided that the parties could refer their questions to the
Director-General of the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cul-

93. Florence Agreement, supra note 90.
94. Belgium, France, Greece, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, and the United Kingdom are the EC Member States that signed the Florence Agreement. Id.
95. The preamble of the Florence Agreement states its purpose as:

The free exchange of ideas and knowledge and, in general, the widest possible
dissemination of the diverse forms of self-expression used by civilizations are vitally important both for intellectual progress and international understanding, and
consequently for the maintenance of world peace; ... these aims will be effectively
furthered by international agreement facilitating the free flow of . . . cultural
materials.

...

Id. pmbl.
96. Id. art. II.
97. Id. art. V.
98. Id. art. IV.
99. Id. art. I.
100. Id. art. VIII.
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tural Organization (UNESCO) for an advisory opinion."'
2.

European Cultural Convention (Cultural Convention) (1954)

The European Cultural Convention is similar to the Florence Agreement in many respects. For example, it recognized both the importance
of the exchange of cultural materials among European states and of Europe's common cultural heritage. Also like the Florence Agreement, the
Cultural Convention imposed only vague duties which could be easily
ignored. The agreement permitted each state to develop its own laws on
the protection of cultural property.' 0 2 The Cultural Convention only required that each of its fifteen signatories 10 3 enact measures to protect its
own cultural heritage as part of its larger duty to preserve the common
cultural heritage of Europe.' 4 The Cultural Convention neither altered
pre-existing agreements, nor interfered with. the potential for future
agreements on the protection of art.'0 5 Finally, the Cultural Convention
created a forum to resolve issues surrounding the exchange and flow of
cultural materials.' 6 The Cultural Convention requires contracting parties to work together through the Council0 7of Europe to ensure the exchange of cultural property among them.'
3. Hague Convention for the Protection of Cultural Property in the
Event of Armed Conflict of 1954 (Hague Convention)
Realizing that war remained a possibility despite efforts to maintain
peace, European leaders formed the Hague Convention for the wartime
protection of art.'0 8 As of 1983, seventy-one states had ratified or acceded

101.
102.
required
103.

Id.
European Cultural Convention, supra note 91, art. 1. The Cultural Convention
only that signatory states develop "appropriate measures." Id.
The fifteen states are Belgium, Denmark, France, the Federal Republic of Ger-

many, Greece, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Norway, Saar,
Sweden, Turkey, and the United Kingdom. Margules, supra note 13, at 616 n.39. Later,
Austria, Spain, and Switzerland also joined the Convention. Id.
104. European Cultural Convention, supra note 91, art. 5. Article 5 provides: "Each
Contracting Party shall regard the objects of European cultural value placed under its
control as integral parts of the common cultural heritage of Europe, shall take appropriate measures to safeguard them and shall ensure reasonable access thereto." Id.
105. Id. art. 8(a).
106. Id. art. 7.
107. Id. art. 6.
108. Hague Convention, supra note 92, arts. 13 and 14. The current Hague Convention, promulgated in 1954, applies during wars and armed conflicts, even if both of
the parties do not recognize the existence of the conflict. Edwards, supra note 18, at 951.
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to the Hague Convention, including the EC Member States of Belgium,
the Federal Republic of Germany, Greece, Spain, France, Italy, Luxembourg, and the Netherlands. 10 9 The Hague Convention shared the Florence Agreement and the European Cultural Convention's coicern for
the common cultural heritage of Europe. 1 0 The agreement's preamble
reflects this concern, asserting that all cultures suffer from damage to
any one culture's artistic heritage. 1
The Hague Convention contains more concrete measures to protect art
than the other early European agreements, and therefore, may have
greater impact. As a baseline, contracting parties pledge to forbid the
theft, pillage, vandalism, and requisition of art works.112 Moreover, occupying states have a duty to help national authorities protect cultural
property if these authorities cannot do so themselves.11 3 The Hague

Convention also protects art by providing for: (1) refuges located an ade-

4
quate distance from industrial centers or important military objectives,
(2) special transport inside and outside the territory," 5 and (3) emblems
on cultural property, art repositories, and the persons who care for
them.116 The Hague Convention not only places prohibitions on the contracting parties, but it also imposes an affirmative duty on the signatories
to take preventative measures during peacetime to protect their art
treasures in case of war.' If a state has not taken appropriate steps for
protection, another contracting party still must refrain from taking any
action which would endanger cultural property in the event of

109.
TION

2

UNITED NATIONS EDUCATIONAL, SCIENTIFIC, AND CULTURAL ORGANIZA-

(UNESCO),

THE PROTECTION OF MOVABLE

CULTURAL PROPERTY

329-30

(1984).
110. See Edwards, supra note 18.
111. Hague Convention, supra note 92, pmbl. The preamble states that "damage to
cultural property belonging to any people whatsoever means damage to the cultural heritage of all mankind, since each people makes its contribution to the culture of the world."
Id.
112. Id. art. 4(3).
113. Id. art. 5.
114. Id. art. 8(a)(1). The Hague Convention lists military objectives such as aerodromes, broadcasting stations, national defense establishments, ports, and railway stations. Id. In the Persian Gulf War, Iraq kept military equipment near cultural monuments, probably believing that the equipment would not be attacked for fear of harming

the monuments. Edwards, supra note 18, at 948 n.138.
115.

Hague Convention, supra note 92, arts. 12 and 13.

116. Id. art. 17.
117. Id. art. 3. Article 3 states: "The High Contracting Parties undertake to prepare
in time of peace for the safeguarding of cultural property situated within their own territory against the foreseeable effects of an armed conflict, by taking such measures as they
consider appropriate." Id.
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hostilities."11

B.

Laws of the EC Member States Designed to Protect Art from
Theft and Illegal Export

Many EC Member States have their own laws governing the export
and import of cultural property. Almost all states use export controls to
regulate the flow of art works from the state."1 9 Export controls take two
forms: screening regulations and embargoes.120 Screening regulations allow a state to develop criteria to determine whether to allow the export
of cultural property. 121 The standards used by states include age, eco-

nomic value, historical importance, and country of origin. The practice
of screening controls the export of art because it allows a state's art to
remain represented in the international market and fosters cultural exchange among states, while discouraging thefts and illegal sales. 2 2 Embargoes have not proven as successful as screening in preventing illegal
sales, smuggling, and theft.' 23 The complete prohibition of exports diverts demand for art works to the black market where a state has no
control over the goods exported. 2 4
Few states have import controls on cultural property.' 25 Some states
impose duties on the import of art, 12 and others prohibit the import of
illegally exported or stolen art. 2 7 Import controls require that one state

recognize another's restrictions on the export of art when determining
whether an art work has been illegally exported. 128 This requirement
may lead to political controversies and explains the unpopularity of im118. Id. art. 4(5). For example, a contracting party must not harm buildings which
house art. Id.
119. Bator, supra note 5, at 313-14. Few states, the United States being a notable
exception, do not restrict the export of art. Id. The United States policy was called into
question, however, when Jackson Pollack's painting Blue Poles was sold to an Australian museum. Merryman, NationalPatrimony,supra note 3, at 157-58. Also, Denmark,
an EC Member State, does not have export controls on art. DuBoFF, NUTSHELL, supra
note 22, at 15. States do, however, encourage the export of works by living artists. Id. at
15-16.
120. DuBOFF, NUTSHELL, supra note 22, at 15.
121. Id.
122.

Id.

123. Id. at 16. For example, after the Mexican government placed an embargo on
pre-Columbian art in 1992, black market sales increased dramatically. Id. at 16-17.
124.
125.

Id. See infra notes 198-201 and accompanying text.
DuBoFF, NUTSHELL, supra note 22, at 18-19.

126. Id. at 18.

127. Id. at 19.
128.

Bator, supra note 5, at 327.
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port controls.12 9
The United Kingdom, France, and Italy are among the EC Member
States that have laws governing the export of art. In fact, the United
Kingdom and France have not signed the UNESCO Convention because
they thought that their own controls were more effective. 3 Each state's
system of screening uses different criteria and procedures to decide
whether to permit export. Despite their differences, all states' laws have
the same goal: keeping cultural goods within their borders.
1. The United Kingdom
The United Kingdom's system of art export controls is based on set
criteria and committee recommendations.1" 1 If the work of art has been
imported into the United Kingdom in the past fifty years, is less than
one hundred years old, and is worth less than four thousand pounds,
then it does need an export license.' 3 2 If the work requires an export
license, then a panel of experts reviews the license request; if the panel
recommends refusal, then they send the application to the Reviewing
Committee on the Export of Works of Art.13 3 The Reviewing Committee
bases its decision whether to grant a license on the work's historical,
aesthetic, and academic importance. 34 If the Reviewing Committee finds

129. Id. For example, the unwillingness of EC nations to recognize each other's definitions of "cultural property" was an obstacle to agreeing on measures to control the
export of art. See infra notes 178-182 and accompanying text.
130. Morris, supra note 37, at 71. The UNESCO Convention on the Means of
Prohibiting and Preventing the Illicit Import, Export, and Transfer of Ownership of
Cultural Property was opened for signature in November 1970. Edwards, supra note 18,
at 925. The UNESCO Convention focused on preventing the flow of cultural materials
from art-rich states and the pillaging of archaeological sites, places of religious significance, and monuments. Id. at 926. Also, it prohibited the importation of cultural property unless its export had been expressly permitted by the exporting state. Id. at 928.
131. The United Kingdom does not have any legislation pertaining specifically to the
export of art, but it regulates its export through the government's export and import
authority. Bator, supra note 5, at 320 n.82.
132. Id. at 320.
133. Morris, supra note 37, at 69.
134. The Reviewing Committee examines whether the artwork is "so closely connected with [the United Kingdom's] history and national life that its departure would be
a misfortune," is "of outstanding aesthetic importance," and is "of outstanding significance for the study of some particular branch of art, learning, or history." Bator, supra
note 5, at 320. These criteria are known as the "Waverly criteiia." Id. at n.84. But see
DuBOFF, DESKBOOK, supra note 1, at 76. DuBoff writes that the United Kingdom enacted its art export controls to control international monetary exchange and to increase
tax revenues rather than to prevent art from leaving the United Kingdom. Id.
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that the work meets the criteria, then it temporarily denies the license in
order to give public museums and collections the opportunity to buy the
work at its market value."3 5 Once a set amount of time elapses without a
domestic buyer, the Reviewing Committee issues the license.1"'
The United Kingdom's licensing system has kept some important
works in the state,1 3 but many others have been exported because of
lack of funds to purchase the works." 8' Nevertheless, the United Kingdom retains more art than it would without any controls by creating an
opportunity for museums to purchase the works and eliminating the primary motive for smuggling art. Owners have no financial incentive to
smuggle the art from the state because they will receive the market value
for the work, whether from the intended purchaser or the British
government.1 3 9
2. France
France has a two-tiered system of export controls on art: some works
may not be exported at all, and others may be exported only after inspection and approval. Works that have been deemed by the Minister of
Cultural Affairs to have "national historic, artistic, scientific or technical

interest" 40 are known as "classified," "scheduled," or "registered" and
absolutely may not be exported from France.""' If a work does not fall
135. Morris, supra note 37, at 69. The museum or collection must pay the price that
the exporter would have received from the party to whom the piece would have been
sold. Id. at 69 n.61.
136. Bator, supra note 5, at 320 n.85.
137. Id. at 320. Paintings such as El Greco's Dream of Phillip II, Rubens's The
Holy Family, and Titian's The Death of Actaeon were purchased by museums before
they could be exported. Id.
138. Id. at 321. For example, the United Kingdom lost Velasquez's Juan de Pareja
when no British museum could pay 2.3 million pounds. Id. at 320 n.85. The Metropolitan Museum of Art (New York) bought the Velasquez painting. See THOMAS HOVING,
MAKING THE MUMMIES DANCE 248-74 (1993) for the story of the painting's purchase.
139. See Bator, supra note 5, at 321. The British government further decreases financial incentive to export art illegally through tax benefits. Owners receive reductions
in estate duties for selling works to the National Gallery, the British Museum, or any
other national museum; to any University, County Council or Municipal Corporation; or
to the National Art Collection Fund or Friends of National Libraries. Id. at 317 n.81.
This arrangement has the benefit of keeping the art work in the United Kingdom's public collections.
140. Morris, supra note 37, at 70 n.70.
141. Id. at 70. Greece has a similar system under which anything older than 1830
belongs to the state. Terry Williams, EC Ministers Debate How to Keep National
Treasures at Home, REUTER LIBR. REP., Oct. 17, 1990, BC Cycle. The Netherlands
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into one of these three categories, then the owner must apply to the Ministry of Education for an export license. 4 2 If an inspection demonstrates
that the work was created after 1920 and that its artist is alive, then
export does not require a license, and the Ministry issues a certificate of
exemption.143 The Ministry usually grants a license to works from
before 1920,4 but may decide to wait six months to give a French museum the opportunity to purchase the work. 4 5 Compensation is not pro-

vided to the owner of a work that may not be exported;"4 6 thus, unlike
under the United Kingdom's system, monetary incentives to smuggle art
remain. The requirement that all works be inspected and licensed makes
the French system difficult to administer, 147 as well as susceptible to
corruption. 4 "
3. .Italy
Under Italian law, any work of artistic or historical importance more
than fifty years old must receive approval from the Ministry of Education before export is permitted.' 4" If approval is denied, then the government has two months to buy the art work.15 0 Sales that do not comply
with the law are deemed void, fines may be assessed, and the illegally
sold or exported works will be confiscated.' 5' If the art cannot be recovered, the party making the illegal transfer may have to pay the govern52
ment the value of the object involved.'

also has a system similar to France's. The sale of art in state museums is restricted, and
the government has made a list of approximately three hundred works and collections
which may not leave the state without approval. Suzanne Perry, EC Debates the Difference Between Picassos and Paint, REUTER LIBR. REP., Oct. 17, 1990, BC Cycle. The
list consists mainly of church-owned silver and sculptures, but also includes a Rembrandt
and a Bruegel. Id. The Dutch government bases its decision whether to grant permission
to export an art work on the work's connection to Dutch history. Id. Spain requires that
all antique cultural objects receive an export license from the government. Id.
142. Morris, supra note 37, at 70.
143. Id. at 70 n.71.
144. Bator, supra note 5, at 315 n.76.
145. Morris, supra note 37, at 70-71.
146. Bator, supra note 5, at 316.
147. Id. at 315 n.76.
148. Id. at 316 n.78. Bator was told that while AndrE Malraux was Minister of
Cultural Affairs, the Ministry would arrange for a seller to receive an export license if
the seller donated a gift of equal artistic significance to the Louvre. Id.
149. Edwards, supra note 18, at 935.
150. Merryman, National Patrimony, supra note 3, at 159.
151. Id. at 160. The fines range from 350 to 26,250 dollars. Id.
152. Id.
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In addition to laws controlling the export of art, Italy also used state
funds to create a national art registry. 5 ' The registry only allows Italian
cultural officials to know what art has or has not been taken, not to
54
protect the art still remaining in Italy.1
IV.

EC TREATIES, REGULATIONS, AND DIRECTIVES DESIGNED TO
PREVENT THE THEFT AND ILLEGAL EXPORT OF ART

A.

EC Treaties

1. Article 36 of the EEC Treaty
In addition to the many European agreements made by EC Member
States to prevent the theft and the illegal export of art, 15 5 the EEC
Treaty itself contains a provision specifically designed to protect cultural
property. Article 36 of the EEC Treaty allows quantitative restrictions
on imports and exports to protect national art treasures.' 5 6 It does not,
however, permit Member States to develop protective measures as a pretense for restricting intra-community trade. 157 EC governing bodies have
strictly construed deviations from the free movement of goods,' 8 thereby
limiting Article 36's effectiveness.
In 1968, the European Court of Justice addressed the use of Article
36 to protect national treasures in Re: Export Tax on Art Treasures:

153.

Haberman, supra note 22. The Ministry of Cultural Affairs' budget is less

than one billion dollars per year-only two-tenths of one percent of government spending. Id.
154. See id. As of 1990, after seventeen years of work, only 1.5 million art works

had been registered. Id. The official in charge of the project estimated that this represented only five percent of Italy's art treasures. Id. Thus, it seems impossible that all of
the art was catalogued in time for the opening of the borders in 1993. Still, as noted
above, the registry serves only as a means of recording information and does not provide
security to the works.

155.
156.

See supra part III.A.
EEC TREATY, supra note 44, art. 36. Article 36 states that the provisions for

the elimination of quantitative restrictions between Member States "shall not preclude
prohibitions or restrictions on imports, exports, or goods in transit justified on the

grounds of ... the protection of national treasures possessing artistic, historic or archaeological value . . . ." Id.
157. Id. The last sentence of Article 36 provides: "Such prohibitions or restrictions
shall not, however, constitute a means of arbitrary discrimination or a disguised restric-

tion on trade between Member States." Id.
158. STEINER, supra note 10, at 70.
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E.C. Commission v. Italy. 59 Italy had included a tax on the export of
cultural property in a law designed to prevent its export.160 The court
invalidated the tax, stating that Article 36 referred only to Articles 30
through 34, which prohibit quantitative restrictions.161 Therefore, the
ECJ concluded that Article 36 only allowed a Member State to use
quantitative restrictions to protect cultural property.' 62 The ECJ decision allows total or partial prohibitions or restrictions, provided that they
do not take the form of a tax or duty. 6 ' The Italian law, however, levied
a customs duty or tax on the export of art, and therefore, was impermissible under Article 36.1"
2.

The Treaty on European Union (Maastricht Treaty)

Although the Treaty on European Union (Maastricht Treaty)16 5 focuses mainly on economic issues, such as establishing a single European

currency and a central bank, 66 it also contains a provision on culture.
159. Commission v. Italy, supra note 52.
160. Article 37 of Italian Law No. 1089, June 1, 1939, taxed the export of artistic,
historical, archeological, and ethnographic articles to other Member States. Id. at 7. The
EC Commission did not object to trying to prevent the export of art under Article 36 but
only opposed the means employed by the Italians. Id. at 9.
161. Id. at 10. Article 16 of the EEC Treaty abolished all customs duties and measures having equivalent effect. See EEC TREATY, supra note 44, art. 16.
162. Commission v. Italy, supra note 52, at 10. The ECJ, construing Article 36
narrowly, held, "In order to be able to rely upon Article 36, the member-States must
remain within the limits traced by that provision as regards the objective to be reached
and the nature of the means." Id.
163. Id. The ECJ defined a measure having the equivalent effect as "any tax which
by altering the price of exported merchandise has on the free circulation of the merchandise the same restrictive effect as a customs duty." Id.
164. Id. at 9.
165. The Treaty was signed in Maastricht on February 7, 1992. Maastricht-What's in the Treaty, PRESS Ass'N NEWSFiLE, July 20, 1993. Originally, the
Maastricht Treaty was to take effect on January 1, 1993, but its implementation has
been delayed because some Member States rejected it. Commission Wants Maaastricht
Ratifications by Year-End, REUTER EURn. COMMUNrry REP'., July 20, 1993, BC Cycle.
On July 23, 1993, the British parliament voted to ratify the Maastricht Treaty after a
long battle, enabling the Treaty's enactment to proceed. Belgium's Dehaene HailsMaastricht Vote in Britain, REUTER EuR. ComsuNvwy REP., July 23, 1993, BC Cycle. Both
the United Kingdom and Germany will not officially ratify the treaty until a court case
about the legislation concludes. Id. The EC Commission hopes that the treaty will be in

effect by January 1, 1994, when the second phase of the economic and monetary union
begins. Commission Wants Maastricht Ratifications by Year-end, supra.
166. See Maastricht-What'sin the Treaty, supra note 165 (setting out key provisions of the Maastricht Treaty).

656

VANDERBILT JOURNAL OF TRANSNATIONAL LAW

[Vol 26.633

The Maastricht Treaty's provision calls for encouragement of national
cultures and for cooperation among the EC Member States to conserve
and safeguard cultural property."6 7 Like earlier European agreements on
art, 68 the Maastricht Treaty views Europe as having a common cultural
heritage, but it also emphasizes the individual national and regional cultures and the importance of preserving them."6 '

B. EC Regulations and Directives
The European Community responded to the concerns of cultural officials on December 9, 1992 by approving a regulation on the export of
cultural goods,'
ending a debate which began in 1989.171 Southern
states, such as Italy and Greece, defeated earlier attempts at reaching an

167, Title IX, Article 128(2) of the Maastricht Treaty provides that:
Action by the Community shall be aimed at encouraging cooperation between
Member States and, if necessary, supporting and supplementing their action in the
following areas:
-improvement of the knowledge and dissemination of the culture and history of
the European peoples;
-conservation and safeguarding of cultural heritage of European significance;
4 GREGG MYLES, EEC BRIEF 228 (rev. 1992) (quoting the Maastricht Treaty, Title IX,
art. 128(2).
168. See supra part III.A.
169. Title IX, Article 128 provides: "The Community shall contribute to the flowering of the cultures of the Member States, while respecting their national and regional
diversity and at the same time bringing the common cultural heritage to the fore." EEC'
BRIEF, supra note 167, at 228 (quoting the Maastricht Treaty, Title IX, art. 128(2)).
170. Council Regulation on the export of cultural goods, 3911/92, 1992 O.J. (L
395) 1 [hereinafter Council Regulation 3911/92]. Although adopted in December 1992,
the Regulation provided that it would not go into effect until the passage of the Directive
on the return of illegally exported cultural property. Id. art. 11. The Directive was not
adopted until March 15, 1993. Council Directive on the return of cultural objects unlawfully removed from the territory of a Member State, 93/7, EEC 1993 O.J. (L 74) 74
[hereinafter Council Directive 93/7/EEC]. Regulations made by the EC Council or
Commission do not require implementation by the individual Member States because
they automatically apply to them as promulgated. STEINER, supra note 10, at 16. Article
189 of the EEC Treaty reads: "A regulation shall have general application. It shall be
binding in its entirety and directly ipplicable in all Member States." EEC TREATY,
supra note 44, art. 189. Directives issued by the EC Council or Commission dictate only
the end which must be achieved by a Member State; the states may implement the goal
as they see appropriate. STEINER, supra note 10, at 20. Article 189 provides: "A directive shall be binding, as to result to be achieved, upon the Member State to which it is
addressed, but shall leave to the national authorities the choice of form and methods."
EEC TREATY, supra note 44, art. 189.
171. Riding, supra note 8.
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agreement on export controls by demanding that longer limitations periods be set on the return of cultural goods.17 2 With Germany's vote, the
states successfully blocked legislation on the export of cultural
property.

17 3

The Regulation adopted on the export of cultural property requires
an export license for cultural property to be removed from the European
Community. 74 The license must be presented at the border through
which the art work leaves the European Community.17 5 A competent
authority in the Member State where the work was located as of January 1, 1993 handles the licensing request.17 ' The Regulation permits
Member States to continue to use Article 36 to protect national
treasures.

17 7

The Regulation does not conclusively define "cultural goods," but instead, allows the individual Member States to devise their own defini-

172. Italy, Greece Block Accord on Cultural Treasures, REUTER LiB. REP., June
19, 1992, BC Cycle. On June 18, 1992, EC ministers reached agreement on all matters
pertaining to cultural property except the issue of time limitations on the return of illegally exported cultural property. Id. Italy and Greece wanted longer time limits than
had been proposed and did not want any time limits on the return of art works in public
collections that had been illegally exported from an EC Member State. Id.
Council Directive on the return of cultural objects unlawfully removed from the territory of a Member State was adopted on March 15, 1993. Council Directive 93/7/EEC,
supra note 170. The enacted Directive requires that the object (1) be a national treasure
as defined by the Member State's own laws, (2) fit within one of the agreed upon categories of art works, and (3) have left the Member State after January 1, 1993. Id. arts. 1
and 13. If these criteria are met, then a Member State's ability to recover the work is
governed by two statutes of limitations. First, the Member State must formally demand
return of the cultural property within one year of the time it learns of the object's location or the identity of its possessor. Id. art. 7(1). Second, restitution proceedings may not
be commenced more than thirty years after the object illegally left the Member State
which is demanding restitution. Id. If the object is part of a public collection, then the
requesting state has a seventy-five year period in which to request return. Id. All Member States must enact any legislation necessary to comply with the Directive within one
year of its adoption. Id. art. 18.
173. Council Directive, 93/7/EEC, supra note 170. Germany opposes any legisla-

tion on the return of cultural goods because its individual federal states control their own
cultural matters, and it does not want a conflict with them. Italy, Greece Block Accord

on Cultural Treasures, supra note 172.
174. Council Regulation 3911/92, supra note 170, art. 2(1). "The export of cultural
goods outside the customs territory of the Community shall be subject to the presentation
of an export license." Id.
175. Id. art. 4.
176. Id. art. 2(2).
177. Id. art. 1.
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tion. 1 8 The Regulation does contain an Annex which lists categories to
which the EC Member States agree that the Regulation applies.1 79 The
categories are based on the age, economic value, and type of object.18
While the Regulation only protects objects on the list, the national laws
of the individual Member States may protect a broader category. 8" The
Member States reached this compromise because they did not want to
have to recognize all of another state's "national treasures. ' 82
V.

THE COMPETING BENEFITS AND DETRIMENTS OF AN ACTIVE
ART TRADE

Despite the danger posed to Europe's art treasures now that they can
be moved easily throughout the European Community, many obstacles
existed to the development of an effective means of preventing the theft
and illegal export of art. As with any issue facing the European Community, Member States have differing interests to protect and differing
perspectives on art trade and export. Moreover, resolving this controversy necessitates that states balance the harms against the benefits of art
trade.
The debate over the export of cultural property divides the EC Member States into northern and southern factions and into those Member
States that benefit from active art trade and those that do not. Southern
Member States fear that the opened borders will result in the movement
of their art treasures to the wealthier northern Member States. France,
Spain, Italy, Portugal, and Greece, therefore, wanted rules which would
enable them to keep their national patrimonies intact. 83 Furthermore, in
southern Europe, the government and the church have been the primary
art patrons, and these institutions favor keeping the art in the state. 4 In
northern Europe, however, the government has traditionally supported

178. Id. pmbl. The preamble states that the Regulation's Annex "is aimed at making

clear the categories of cultural goods which should be given particular protection in trade
with third countries, but is not intended to prejudice the definition, by Member States, of
national treasures within the meaning of Article 36 of the Treaty ....

."

Id.

179. Id. art. 1.
180. Id. Annex. For example, the definition covers paintings which are more than
fifty years old and worth more than 150,000 European Currency Units. Id.
181. Id. art. 2(2). Cultural goods to which the Regulation does not apply are governed by the laws of the Member State of export. Id. art. 2(4).
182.

Culture: Export Regulation and Restitution Legislation to Protect National

Treasures, EUR. REP., Jan. 15, 1992, at IV.10.
183. Riding, supra note 8. Spain's EC cultural affairs minister noted that now "people go to a little village and take things and sell them." Perry, supra note 141.
184. Stille, supra note 30, at 2:27.
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185
an active art trade.

States want to retain cultural property as part of their national wealth
and as a means of promoting tourism. 8 Of course, if a party outside the
state will pay fair market value for the art work, then the state's monetary wealth will not decrease."8 7 Art-rich EC Member States, such as
Greece, Spain, Italy, and France, 8 allege, however, that the prices paid
for works do not actually represent fair market value, nor do they compensate a state for the social costs of having the work exported.I' 9 Moreover, they claim that the price paid cannot compensate the state for the
resulting decrease in the intangible cultural and identity wealth bound
up in a state's art collection.' 9
Trade in art has many benefits, however. One of the main benefits of
an active legal art trade is the preservation of cultural property. Legal
transactions enable art to flow to where it is wanted, and therefore to
where it will be preserved for the benefit of all. 9 ' The prohibition of art
export by art-rich states often harms these states' treasures. For the very
reason that some states are art-rich, these same states are preservationpoor. The sheer volume of the cultural materials possessed by art-rich
states overwhelms their resources, financial and otherwise, making them
unable to care for the works properly. 19 2

185. Id.
186. Bator, supra note 5, at 303. Recognizing the importance of tourism, the Council of the European Communities has devised a "Community action plan" to promote
tourism. Council Decision on a Community plan to assist tourism, July 13, 1992, 92/
421/EEC 1992 O.J. (L 231) 26. The plan contains specific provisions addressing the
importance of cultural heritage to tourism. Id. Annex (5) and pmbl. Significantly, the
plan views the cultural heritage as a common one, calling it "European" and noting its
contribution to "the idea of 'European citizenship.'" Id. pmbl.
187. Bator, supra note 5, at 303.
188. See Riding, supra note 8.
189. Bator, supra note 5, at 303 n.55. "Art-rich" states have vast art resources,
while "art-poor" states want to purchase art from these states. Margules, supra note 13.
Art-poor states, such as the United States, Japan, and the United Kingdom, do not necessarily lack their own cultural property, however. Id.
190. Bator, supra note 5, at 304. This is most easily seen with art of historical
importance, such as the Notre Dame Cathedral in Paris. Id.
191. See id. at 297. Bator admits that while many art-rich states do not care properly for their art treasures, exporting to art-poor states does not ensure better treatment
of the works. Id. For example, damage could be sustained during transport, or the object
could be moved to a location with a higher risk of earthquake, fire, or war. Id.
192. See John Henry Merryman & Albert E. Elsen, The Importance of a Licit Mar-

ket, reprinted in 1987

LAW, ETHICS, AND THE VISUAL ARTS

63 (John Henry Mer-

ryman & Albert E. Elsen eds., 1987) [hereinafter Merryman, Licit Market]. One author
has written about duplicative art works that "'Italian archaeologists laugh hollowly
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Also, many works are not exhibited because the best examples of any
given era, school, or artist are already on display within the state. 193 No
reason exists to preserve cultural property if it cannot be seen or studied;
therefore, export controls seem counter-productive." 4 Other states' museums and private collections would benefit from these duplicative works
and would properly care for them. 95 Although many export controls
endeavor to keep art in public collections, 9 6 private ownership may foster art in both the short and long run."' 7
Additionally, legal trade in art deflates the demand for art in illegal
markets by providing a legitimate market. Despite strict controls, demand for art works will exist; controls will only divert the demand into
illegal markets.1 98 The sale of art on the black market has high costs for
art works. For example, works do not command their full value on the
black market, 9 and the black market increases the risk of destruction of

when newspapers report the theft of some "unique, priceless" Etruscan vase. They
know, but the public does not, how many thousands of these "unique, priceless" vases
they already have in storage and quite literally don't know what to do with.'" Bator,
supra note 5, at 298 (quoting Gaskill, They Smuggle History, ILLUSTRATED LONDON
NEWS, June 14, 1969, at 28).

193. See Merryman, National Patrimony, supra note 3.
194. See Bator, supra note 5, at 299.
195. See Merryman, National Patrimony, supra note 3, at 162. Selling duplicative
works would be a "good will" gesture to museums, dealers, and collectors and might
increase their willingness to obey export controls. Id. Great controversy surrounds the
practice of deaccessioning, or selling, works from the collections of museums. Discussion
of this issue is beyond the scope of this Note. See generally DuBoFF, DESKBOOK, supra
note 1, at 933-43.
196. This goal is reflected by laws which allow museums a set amount of time to
match the offer made by a foreign purchaser. See supra part III.B.
197. See Bator, supra note 5, at 300. Private collectors often donate their collections
to public museums and collections or make their collections available for public viewing.
Id. Also, private collectors may be more daring than those in charge of cultivating public
collections, and thus they preserve art that will become historically important in the future. Id. Others disagree, such as Giulio Carlo Argan, who is an art historian, the former Mayor of Rome, and an Italian senator. Haberman, supra note 22. Argan believes
that the purchase of art by private investors wrongfully takes it from the public domain
where it can be studied by scholars and enjoyed by the public. Id.
198. See Perry, supra note 141. According to Joel-Marie Million, president of the
Druout group of auctioneers in Paris, strict controls "stimulate the black market. Sales
go underground. You need to be flexible if you're not going to encourage fraud." Riding,
supra note 8. Anthony Brown, a senior director at Christie's auction house in London,
agrees, contending that strict controls are "bad for everyone who wants a legitimate art
market and not one taking place behind closed doors." Id.
199. Privat, supra note 39. Usually art works sell for less than one-third of their fair
market value on the black market. Id.
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the cultural property.20 0 Also, it leaves the government without any con20
trol over transactions involving art works.

1

The ability to continue actively and legally trading in art also has
economic importance to some EC Member States. This is especially true
of the United Kingdom. 2° The London art trade produces great revenues for the government and provides jobs for many individuals." 3 Approximately five billion dollars changes hands each year in the United
Kingdom's auction trade, and London is the location for fifty to seventyfive percent of the EC's art trade. 0 4 In order to continue this high volume of trade, the United Kingdom wanted a narrow definition of "national treasures" in any EC art policy20 5 and opposed measures requiring the return of cultural property. 206 Restitution demands would
necessitate that an auction house pull an art work from the auction indefinitely until the foreign state's claim is resolved.20 7 Strict policies
could force the art market out of the European Community
completely. 0 8
In addition to the economic importance of art trade, an active art market has other intangible virtues. For example, living artists need a free

200. See Bator, supra note 5, at 295-97.
201. DuBOFF, NUTSHELL, supra note 22, at 16.
202. Germany, the Netherlands, and Belgium also have active art markets. Riding,
supra note 8.
203. Official figures estimate that London has 2,400 art dealers. Allison Roberts,
London is Mecca for Art Smugglers, THE TIMES, Feb. 24, 1993. Of these, Interpol
estimates that six hundred dealers have knowingly sold illegally exported art. Id. Lord
Gowrie, chairman of Sotheby's and former Arts Minister in the United Kingdom (198385), said that many come to London to buy art, noting that "people do not come from all
over the world to Britain for the sun." Lord Gowrie, If Brussels Fails to Get It Right,
DAILY TELEGRAPH,

Feb. 10, 1992, at 14.

204. Roberts, supra note 203. London is the site of eighty-five to ninety percent of
the antiquities trade. Id.
205. Perry, supra note 141.
206. Riding, supra note 8. Even art dealers in Italy do not want their trade burdened by additional regulations. Haberman, supra note 22.
207. Riding, supra note 8.
208. See Gowrie, supra note 203. According to Lord Gowrie, chairman of Sotheby's
and former Arts Minister of England, the auction houses of Sotheby's and Christie's
have indicated that they might move their headquarters to Geneva, even though they do
not wish to do so. Simon Tait, Battle on the Border, THE TIMES, June 3, 1992. Controls
imposed on auctioneers by France have already moved Sotheby's auctions of French art
to Monaco. Havemann, supra note 66. Sotheby's circumvents France's system by showing art in Paris one day and then taking the works to Monaco to be sold on the following
day. Id. Transporting the works leads to an increased risk of destruction or damage. See
supra note 197 and accompanying text.
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art market in order to earn a living.20 9 The potential to earn a living 2as
10
an artist in an accessible market creates an incentive to produce art.
Moreover, the ability to export freely gives the living artist the opportunity to be evaluated and appreciated internationally."'
Beyond the benefits accruing to individual artists, the art market also
has the ability to foster understanding and appreciation among states.212
Early European agreements on art, such as the Florence Agreement, recognized this characteristic of art, viewing the flow of art as a means of
maintaining world peace. 213 Moreover, art trade enables states to import

works from other states, furthering the education of their own citizens. 214
Finally, a strictly regulated art market compromises the EC's fundamental tenet of the free movement of goods. EC governing bodies have
staunchly protected this principle of the European Community, and exceptions to the free movement of goods have been read narrowly. 15 For
example, the European Court of Justice looks at the effect of a national
law or program on the free movement of goods, rather than at the name
216
of the program or the motive behind it.

VI.

EFFECTIVENESS OF PROPOSED SOLUTIONS

The European Community had a difficult task in designing a measure
that would adequately protect Europe's cultural property while satisfying all of the parties involved. The diversity of the states in the European Community led to differing positions on the export of cultural
property. Southern EC Member States wanted more stringent controls
on the export of art to prevent its sale to wealthier northern Member
States.21 7 Conversely, northern Member States sought looser controls in
order to continue the art trade that contributes to their economic

209. Williams, supra note 141. Some states do not regulate the export of art by
living artists. See supra note 119 and accompanying text.
210. Bator, supra note 5, at 308.
211.

Id.

212. See id. at 306-07.
213. See supra part III.A.1.
214. See Bator, supra note 5, at 307.
215. STEINER, supra note 10, at 70. See supra part IV.A.1 for a discussion of the
ECJ's narrow reading of Article 36 of the EEC Treaty, which allows quantitative measures for the protection of art.
216. Steiner, supra note 10, at 70. For example, the ECJ held the Irish Goods
Council's "Buy Irish" Campaign to violate Art. 30 of the EEC Treaty in Commission v
Ireland. Id. at 82. The ECJ found that the campaign might undermine the European
Community's goal of eliminating quantitative restrictions on imports. Id.
217. See supra notes 183 and 184 and accompanying text.
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wealth.21
As with most legislation, and especially characteristic of measures requiring extensive compromises by all parties, the Regulation enacted by
the European Community on the export of cultural property has many
flaws and does not completely satisfy any one Member State's demands.
First, the Regulation cannot keep art in the Member State that wants to
prevent its export. It purports to prevent the export of art only from the
European Community, not from one Member State to another. This arrangement seemingly has the benefit of allowing art trade, while keeping
the art in the European Community.
Individual Member States may continue to apply their own laws as to
whether a work may be exported, but without internal border controls,
may not move to enforce the Regulation until a party attempts to remove
the work from the European Community.2 19 Thus, the Regulation does
nothing to prevent cultural property from flowing freely to wealthier
northern WEC Member States from the collections of southern EC Member States. In theory, EC Member States may rely on Article 36 to prevent movement of art treasures between Member States. Again, however,
their inability to use border controls as a means of enforcement hinders
any effort.
Second, the Regulation contains a loophole that will allow some art to
be exported from the European Community. The export of any work not
falling within the categories specified by the Regulation's Annex is governed by the law of the Member State from which it is being exported.2 2 Thus, a work protected by the laws of a Member State with
strict export controls, but not by the Regulation, could be smuggled into
a Member State with looser export controls and then removed from the
European Community. For example, a work could be taken from
Greece, in which all art created before 1830 belongs to the government,
to the United Kingdom, which has looser controls based on factors such
as the object's connection to British history. The British Reviewing
Committee might then issue a license and permit the export of the art
work.

218. See supra notes 202-208 and accompanying text.
219. Article 2 of Council Regulation 3911/92 only requires a license for export
"outside the customs territory of the Community .... " Council Regulation 3911/92,
supra note 170, art. 2.
220. See id. art. 2(4). Article 2(4) states: "Without prejudice to the provisions of this
Article, direct export from the customs territory of the Community of national treasures
having artistic, historic or archaeological value which are not cultural goods within the
meaning of this Regulation is subject to the national laws of the Member State of export." Id.
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Without a Community-wide definition of "national treasure," no solution to the above problem exists without compromising the principle of
free movement of goods and persons. Because of the differing views
among EC Member States as to what constitutes a "national treasure,"
reaching a uniform definition probably is impossible.
Third, the Regulation does not eliminate the financial incentive to export art illegally. To remedy this omission, it needs to provide compensation to owners of works who are refused export licenses. Such provisions
obviate the need to endrun screening controls and encourage owners to
sell their works through legitimate channels, rather than on the black
market where the risk of destruction is greater and the works generally
command less than their fair market value. Also, a measure like the
United Kingdom's, which reduces estate duties for selling works to pub-

lic collections, would decrease the monetary motivations for smuggling,
" '
while keeping art in the public domain.22

VII.

CONCLUSION

The issue of controlling the export of cultural property arose .in the
context of efforts to protect Europe's art treasures. Now it has degenerated into a battle of national and regional self-interests. Thus, the EC
Member States must reaffirm the true purpose underlying the negotiations: the protection and preservation of art. These goals can best be
achieved if the states adhere to the underlying belief of many of the early
European agreements to protect art: Europe shares a common cultural
heritage that the states have a collective duty to protect. The ambiguity
surrounding the true national identity of many significant art works
evinces this common cultural heritage. For example, to which state does
the Rokeby Venus, a work by Spanish painter Velasquez painted in Italy
belong
and housed in England, belong? 22 2 And do the works of Picasso
223
domicile?
chosen
his
France,
to
or
birthplace,
his
to Spain,
The flaws in the enacted Regulation and the difficulties in enacting an
effective regulation without undermining the free movement of goods
point to a glaring need for a different solution to the problem of the
export of cultural property. One solution would involve a compromise:
keep art trade relatively unregulated, while focusing on protecting the
works in public collections from theft and illegal export. Implementing
the first part of the compromise would contribute greatly to the achieve-

See supra note 139.
Art Sans Frontiers, THE TIMEs, Nov. 11, 1992.
223. See Privat, supra note 39.
221.

222.
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ment of the second part.
First, allowing art trade will boost national revenues, resulting in
greater funds for installing security measures in churches, museums, and
smaller galleries. To satisfy those who oppose the movement of works to
private collections, public collections could be granted a right of refusal
to purchase the work. Selling duplicative or less significiant works- from
public collections would generate funds that could be used to purchase
art works to prevent them from leaving the state. 24 These sales would
raise still more money for security measures and the care of art works in
public collections.
The current practice of hoarding cultural property benefits no one.
Instead, EC Member States should work together to facilitate the sale,.
exchange, and exhibition of duplicative art works, rather than allowing
them to fall into disrepair, unseen, in warehouses and museum storerooms. Making these works available for sale would create greater access
for museums. 2 5 and private collectors and would dampen demand on the
black market, where the risk of destruction and damage is great.
The EC Member States must strike a balance between the need for an
active art trade, which is important to some states' economies, and the
rights of states to keep their cultural heritages and identities intact.
Equally important is a speedy resolution of the issue. The delay in the
complete elimination of border controls throughout the EC serves as a
grace period for the EC to reach a satisfactory resolution. Already, many
states, such as the Schengen signatories, have begun dismantling their
checks, and other states will soon follow.
Kimberly A. Short

224. Merryman, Licit Market, supra note 192, at 63. Merryman and Elsen write,
"The nation that both prohibits a licit market and pleads poverty as an excuse for failure
to develop and protect its cultural property is acting inconsistently. On the contrary, it
would advance the national, as well as the international, interest if the art-rich nation
were to treat its cultural treasure as an exploitable national resource." Id.
225. Museums often purchase works of dubious provenance. See Stille, supra note
30, at 2:27.

